DOM Clobbering


This wiki is meant to introduce readers to DOM Clobbering and also serve as a reference guide for experienced researchers and developers for DOM Clobbering vulnerabilities.

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DOM Clobbering[1, 2, 3] is a type of JavaScript-less injection attack where attackers confuse the client-side JavaScript code of web applications by inserting a piece of non-script HTML markup into webpages, and transforming it into executable code leveraging named property accesses.

DOM Clobbering vulnerabilities originate from a naming collision between JavaScript variables and named HTML markups, i.e., markups with an id or name attribute

Named Properties in DOM

One of the ways JavaScript programs can manipulate the contents of webpages is through the Document Object Model (DOM) a tree-structured representation of the rendered webpages.

Normally, DOM tree elements can be accessed in JavaScript via the object selector methods of the document object, e.g., document.getElementById(x) to locate the element with id x.

However, that is not the only way and the same can be acheived via a property of the document and global window objects, e.g., document.x, or window.x, known as named property access, as specified in HTML and DOM living standards.

Accordingly, web browsers map HTML elements to JavaScript objects automatically based on the element named properties. Such named properties are, for example, id and name HTML tag attributes.

Attack Examples

When an undefined variable and an HTML markup have the same name, the browser replaces the content of the variable with the DOM object mirroring the markup type.

Example 1:

1. var s = document.createElement('script');
2. let config = window.globalConfig || {href: 'script.js'};
3. s.src = config.href;
4. document.body.appendChild(s);

The snippet shows a vulnerable code, which loads a script whose URL is stored in a global configuration object, i.e., window.globalConfig. Specifically, the code first creates a script tag (line 1), and then, it retrieves the global configuration object and stores it in a local variable config (line 2). If the configuration object does not exist, it uses a minimal default configuration, i.e., {href: script.js'} (line 2). Then, the program sets the src attribute of the newly created script tag to the href property of the configuration object (line 3) and appends the new script to the DOM tree, resulting in the execution of the script (line 4).

The vulnerability originates in the assignment in line 2 because attackers can control the value of window.globalConfig, and ultimately, pick the script src value of their choosing by injecting an HTML tag with id="globalConfig", e.g., <a id="globalConfig" href="malicious.js">.

When parsing such a markup code, the browser maps the anchor tag element to the window.globalConfig property as mandated by the named property accesses. The escalation to arbitrary code execution happens in line 3, when the code reads the href property of the object window.globalConfig, which no longer contains the object with the global configuration but it contains the attacker-controlled anchor tag whose href property value is malicious.js.

Note. Attackers can abuse named property accesses in other ways, where instead of overwriting variables by HTML nodes, they can overshadow browser APIs. For example, if the attacker inserts a markup with id=getElementbyId in DOM, then the API document.getElementbyId no longer refers to the built-in API for finding an element in the DOM tree, but rather mirrors the DOM element with id getElementbyId in the DOM tree. This behaviour is due to the so-called named property visibility algorithm.

Example 2:

1. document.conf = {};
2. const queryParams = new URLSearchParams(;
3. if(isTrustedOrigin(queryParams.get('next'))){
4.   document.conf.src = queryParams.get('next');
5. }
6. // [...]
7. let next = document.conf.src || '';
8. window.location.href = next;
9. // [...]
10. function isTrustedOrigin(url){ 
11.  let targetOrigin = new URL(url).origin;
12.  let trustedOrigins= [
13.    new URL('').origin, 
14.    new URL('').origin
15.  ];
16.  if(trustedOrigins.indexOf(targetOrigin) !== -1) return true;
17.  return false;
18. }

The snippet above reads the value of a query parameter next, and if it belongs to a trusted domain, it stores it globally in document.conf.src (lines 1-4). Then, it redirects the page to document.conf.src or a default value (line 6).

This script is vulnerable because it ignores the fact that assignments to document are always overshadowed by DOM Clobbering. For example, if attackers inject <img name="conf" src="javascript:alert(1)">, the document.conf would point to the image tag, so document.conf.src is an attacker-controlled JavaScript payload. Hence, this results in XSS when assigned to the top window location (line 8).

About This Wiki

While the wiki covers different aspects of DOM Clobbering, new clobbering techniques and threats are always emerging. Improvements and suggestions, whether to add new content or expand existing documentation, are always more than appreciated. For more information, please refer to contribution guidelines.


  1. Gareth Heyes, “DOM Clobbering strikes back.” Link.

  2. Neil Jenkins, “Sanitising HTML – the DOM clobbering issue.” Link.

  3. Mario Heiderich, Christopher Späth, Jörg Schwenk, “DOMPurify: Client-side Protection Against XSS and Markup Injection”, Link.